A major deal illustrates how the SAF market really works 

On June 5, 2026, Google and American Airlines announced a three-year agreement under which Google will purchase sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) certificates (SAFc) associated with 35 million gallons of SAF. American will take physical delivery of the fuel at Chicago O'Hare. Google receives the emissions attributes. The arrangement relies on book-and-claim accounting, in which the physical fuel and the environmental attribute are legally separated and transferred to different parties.

The deal is a window into how the SAF market works, and what every company in the value chain needs to understand before entering it.

The SAF cost premium is structural, not a market inefficiency

There is a persistent hope in the aviation industry that SAF will eventually reach price parity with fossil jet fuel. This will not happen, at least not through any mechanism that currently exists or is credibly in development.

The economics are the product of thermodynamics. Petroleum is pre-deoxygenated; over millions of years, heat and pressure stripped oxygen from biological material, concentrating energy into the hydrocarbons we pump out of the ground today. Bio-based SAF feedstocks, e.g., vegetable oils, agricultural residues, and other biomass, are oxygen-rich (carbohydrates, not hydrocarbons). Power-to-liquid e-fuels start from captured CO₂, which is fully oxidized. 

Either way, every SAF production pathway must pay an energy debt to remove or chemically reduce that oxygen, in the form of hydrogen deoxygenation, energy inputs, and processing costs. This is not a manufacturing inefficiency that scale will solve. It is a constraint baked into the feedstocks themselves.

The numbers reflect this. According to the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the average market price of SAF in 2024 was approximately €2,085 per tonne, roughly three times the €734 per tonne average for conventional jet fuel. 

The cheapest pathway, hydroprocessed esters and fatty acids (HEFA), produced from waste oils like used cooking oil or tallow, represents almost all current SAF supply and sits at the lower end of the SAF cost range. Costlier cellulosic and e-fuel pathways push it higher. EASA estimates 2024 production costs for power-to-liquid e-fuels at €7,695 per tonne, approximately ten times the cost of conventional kerosene. While these costs can and will come down, none are expected to approach price parity.

The feedstock ceiling compounds this. HEFA from waste oils is the cheapest SAF pathway, but waste oil supply is finite and competes with renewable diesel, which typically offers better margins for producers. As mandates push SAF volumes beyond what HEFA can supply, the industry must move to cellulosic biomass or power-to-liquid pathways, at progressively higher cost. Scaling the SAF industry does not automatically bring prices down. In the near term, it pushes them up.

Policy determines who absorbs the cost

If price parity is not coming, the cost premium lands somewhere. Two policy philosophies have emerged to answer that question.

Europe has largely adopted the polluter-pays principle: SAF mandates place the cost burden on fuel suppliers and, by extension, on airlines and their passengers. The EU's ReFuelEU Aviation regulation and the UK's SAF mandate both carry steep penalties for non-compliance. As Carbon Direct has documented, in the UK, those penalties range from three to 13 times the cost of compliance, depending on the obligation type and year, signaling that regulators are serious about pushing aviation toward sustainable fuels.

The United States approached the problem differently, leaning on taxpayer subsidies.The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) 45Z Clean Fuel Production Credit and its predecessor, the 40B Sustainable Aviation Fuel Credit sought to socialize much of the cost premium. The appeal of this approach was that it made SAF economics viable without raising ticket prices. Its vulnerability was political: when the IRA's incentive landscape was revised, the project pipelines that had formed around those credits evaporated quickly. US taxpayer-funded support proved politically less durable than the UK and EU’s mandated compliance obligations.

Neither model works in isolation. Mandates without bankable project finance generate demand signals but no new supply. Incentives without policy durability attract project interest but cannot get facilities to final investment decisions. The deals that have actually moved capital combine a stable policy floor,whether mandate or incentive,with long-term private commitments that provide the revenue certainty project finance requires.

The Google-American Airlines deal illustrates the incentives-plus-private-commitment structure. The deal explicitly credits the Illinois SAF tax credit as the enabling policy lever. HEFA SAF of this type is eligible to generate Renewable Fuel Standard credits (RINs), and fuel produced from 2025 onward qualifies for the IRA's 45Z Clean Fuel Production Credit. This stack provides additional floor economics. The corporate offtake completes the structure by delivering the revenue certainty that volatile policy credits alone cannot. Remove any one of those elements and the deal's economics likely do not hold.

Nobody in this market is buying SAF for its energy content

This is the key to understanding how the SAF market works. Neither airlines nor corporate buyers purchase SAF for its energy content. Airports have kerosene. Airlines do not need SAF to keep planes in the air. Corporate buyers, like Google, have minimal operational use for aviation fuel at all. While recent global disruptions in crude oil supply have highlighted SAF in the context of energy security, the industry as it exists today does not represent a realistic hedge against conventional fuel volatility.

What all parties are buying is the sustainability attribute attached to the fuel. For airlines, the relevant claim is a scope 1 emissions reduction: the right to report lower lifecycle carbon intensity for their flight operations. For corporate buyers, the relevant claim is a scope 3 reduction, a documented abatement of the emissions associated with their employees' business travel. Book-and-claim accounting makes this architecture explicit: it legally severs the physical fuel from the environmental attribute, allowing each to be transferred to the party that values it. The fuel is the delivery mechanism for the claim. 

This distinction matters for assessing the market. Airlines operate on among the lowest margins of any major industry. They cannot absorb the cost premium voluntarily without fundamentally compromising their finances. They participate in SAF markets when required to by mandate, or when a corporate partner subsidizes the premium by purchasing certificates downstream. The cost premium does not disappear; it shifts. Understanding where it lands is the starting point for any serious procurement decision. 

Corporate climate programs have finite budgets. SAF competes with renewable electricity procurement, fleet electrification, CO2 removal, and supply chain decarbonization for the same dollars. Buyers who want their sustainability claims to match the actual sources of their emissions (rather than offsetting aviation with unrelated activities elsewhere) have a genuine reason to prefer SAF. 

A SAF claim is only as strong as the quality behind it

SAF buyers and sellers trade sustainability claims. The quality of those claims is the entire value proposition, and the reputational liability travels with them. The companies with the greatest willingness to pay for SAF certificates tend to be those with the most brand exposure: high-profile technology companies, professional services firms, and financial institutions. These are also the companies most likely to face scrutiny from regulators, NGOs, and investors if a claim does not hold up. Buying a certificate does not protect a company from that scrutiny. It transfers the liability along with the attribute.

That means a rigorous buyer needs to answer at least three distinct questions before relying on a SAF claim.

1. Does this fuel actually reduce lifecycle emissions? 

SAF's climate case rests on a carbon cycle argument: the feedstock absorbs CO₂ from the atmosphere as it grows, so when that carbon is released during combustion, the net addition to the atmosphere is theoretically near zero. But that logic holds only if upstream production is clean, and it often is not. 

Indirect land use change(when demand for a feedstock crop displaces food agriculture elsewhere, triggering clearing of forests or grasslands) can generate substantial emissions elsewhere in the global land and food system, eroding or eliminating the lifecycle benefit. Even waste-based feedstocks are not automatically clean: used cooking oil and tallow have existing market uses, and diverting them without careful accounting can displace those uses, alter commodity markets, and create emissions leakage elsewhere. 

2. Is the purchase additional? 

Additionality asks whether the procurement caused SAF to exist that otherwise would not have. This is a harder question than it appears, especially in markets where multiple policy support mechanisms are already active. For the Google-American Airlines deal, one critical variable for financial additionality—the SAFc price—has not been disclosed. If Illinois credits and federal RINs already cover most of the HEFA cost premium, then the question of what Google's purchase actually caused to happen is genuinely open. However, American Airlines has stated publicly that the long-term nature of the agreement enabled them to secure a new SAF offtake with Valero Marketing and Supply Company. The supply arrangement that may not have been bankable on the basis of volatile RIN markets and changeable policy alone. That is a real additionality argument. But it requires transparency to evaluate. The undisclosed SAF credit price is a current market liability, not just in this deal, but across the voluntary SAF market broadly.

Long-term offtakes do something that policy credits cannot: they provide stable, bankable revenue certainty. RIN prices fluctuate. Tax credits change with administrations. Neither can reliably anchor a final investment decision at the project level. A multi-year, creditworthy offtake agreement can. This is the distinctive and genuinely valuable role that corporate buyers play in this market: not paying the cost premium per gallon, but reducing the financial risk premium that keeps capital on the sidelines.

3. Is the full supply chain sound? 

Carbon claims are not the only dimension of sustainability that matters to a buyer's reputation. Companies making claims about their SAF procurement are implicitly making claims about their supply chains. That means labor practices, community impacts, Indigenous rights, feedstock sourcing integrity, and market leakage from displaced uses all fall within the scope of what a rigorous buyer should evaluate. A SAF supply chain that displaces food crops, harms a proximate community, or causes deforestation through indirect land use change creates a reputational problem that no certificate can fix.

What high-integrity SAF procurement looks like

The voluntary SAF market is still early, and the transparency it requires does not yet exist consistently. Carbon Direct recently released the Criteria for High-Quality Low Carbon Fuels, a comprehensive, publicly available framework designed to help close that gap. 

The criteria address six principles across the full supply chain: carbon accounting, additionality, feedstock sourcing, leakage, environmental harms, and social harms and environmental justice. They are designed as a practical reference for what a credible SAF claim requires, and where existing certifications may leave gaps that require additional diligence.

At the transaction level, five questions should have clear answers before any buyer signs an offtake:

1. Is the certificate linked to a specific project or supply agreement? 

2. Is that project financially dependent on the offtake, after accounting for all policy support already in the stack? 

3. Is the lifecycle emissions profile documented across the full well-to-wheel boundary, including indirect effects? 

4. Are the feedstock sourcing and supply chain risks assessed and disclosed? 

5. Has the producer evaluated leakage and community impacts?

The Google-American Airlines deal demonstrates what serious voluntary SAF procurement can look like. The Criteria for High-Quality Low Carbon Fuels provides the framework buyers need to evaluate deals like this one rigorously. 

How Carbon Direct can help

Carbon Direct provides advisory services to companies navigating SAF procurement, lifecycle assessment, and low-carbon fuels strategy.

Learn more about our sustainable aviation fuel services.